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INDIAN LAW 
I. NAVAJO-HOPI CONFLICT AND THE APPLICATION 
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW PRINCIPLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald1 the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit considered the conflicting claims of the Hopi 
and Navajo Tribes to reservation lands that make up the north-
east corner of the State of Arizona. The history of this inter-
tribal conflict extends over several hundred years and has re-
sulted in numerous actions in federal courts.2 
The histories of the tribes are important for an appreciation 
of the issues raised in Sekaquaptewa. The Hopi entered the con-
tested area first, and by the 16th century had settled on portions 
of the land in question, established pueblo villages, and success-
fully farmed the semi-arid Iand.3 The Navajo Tribe, a nomadic 
people, apparently first entered the area during the 17th century 
and initiated raids on Hopi settlements which continued 
through the 19th century." Protected by their fortress-like pue-
blos, the Hopi endured the occasional depredations of the larger 
and more aggressive Navajo Tribe and continued their agrarian 
lifestyle.1I 
1. 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Skopil, J.; the other panel members were Ander-
son, J., and Bonsal, D.J.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 565 (Dec. 1980). 
2. See 619 F.2d 801, 803 (1980); Sekaquaptewa v. McDonald, 591 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 
1979); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Ariz. 1978); all pertaining to 
the Act of 1934. See also Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1976); Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 
F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1972); Healing v. 
Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963); all of which pertain to 
the 1882 Executive Order. 
3. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134 (D. Ariz. 1862), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963). 
See F. WALTERS, BOOK OF THE HOPI (1963), for a general history of the religious and 
social development of the Hopi Tribe. 
4. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134-35, 146-48 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 
758 (1963). See also J. 'rERRELL, THE NAVAJO 80 (1970). 
5. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134, 145. (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 
(1963). 
305 
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The coming of white settlers into the southwest, particularly 
to New Mexico where the Navajo were principally located, dra-
matically changed the Navajo lifestyle.s In 1864, the United 
States Army defeated the Navajo in a major "Indian War," and 
confined a large portion of the tribe for several years at Fort 
Defiance, near the Arizona-New Mexico border.7 In 1868 the tri-
bal representatives signed a treaty with the United States8 
which required other bands of the tribe then in southern New 
Mexico to rejoin the tribe on land set aside for tribal use near 
Fort Definance.9 The Navajo attempted to resume their tradi-
tional nomadic lifestyle, and began to move west into Hopi 
territory. 
B. LEGAL HISTORY 
The Treaty of 1868 between the United States and the Nav-
ajo granted the tribe reservation land in the northwest corner of 
New Mexico and the northeast corner of Arizona. This treaty 
placed the Navajo on the eastern boundary of the Hopi-claimed 
lands. Although the treaty restricted the Navajo to their reserva-
tion, the Army paid little attention to the Navajo's western in-
cursions into Hopi-held land.1o No action was taken in response 
to repeated requests by local Indian agents for the Secretary of 
the Interior to remove the Navajo from Hopi lands and to estab-
lish permanent boundaries between the tribes.ll 
In 1882, by Executive Order, the United States set aside a 
tract from public lands expressly "for the use and occupancy of 
the Moqui [Hopi] and such other Indians as the Secretary of the 
Interior may see fit to settle thereon."12 Despite this specific al-
6. Id. at 134-37. 
7. Id. at 135. 
8. Treaty With the Navajo Indians, June I, 1861, art. xm, 15 Stat. 667 (1934) 
("The tribe herein named, by their representatives, parties to this treaty, agree to make 
the reservation herein described their permanent home, and they will not as a tribe make 
any permanent settlement elsewhere . • . ."). 
9. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134 (D. Ariz. 1962). 
10. Id. at 135-37. 
11. Id. at 146-50. 
12. EXEC. ORDER of Dec. 16, 1882, reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS LAWS 
AND TREATIES 805 (1904) ("It is hereby ordered that the tract of country . . . is hereby, 
withdrawn from settlement and sale, and set apart for the use and occupancy of the 
Moqui [Hopi] and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle 
thereon."). 
The term "Moqui" is It Navajo term meaning "dead one" and was used by the In-
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location, the Navajo continued to settle in and around the area 
of the Hopi Reservation. Subsequent to the establishment of the 
Navajo Reservation of 1868 and the Hopi Reservation of 1882, 
executive orders set aside additional tracts of public land for In-
dian use.13 Several of these orders expressly added the new lands 
to' the Navajo Reservation; others designated the lands only for 
"Indian purposes."!"' As these tracts were added to the reserva-
tions, the tribes remained in conflict over what the Hopi consid-
ered to be Navajo encroachment on Hopi lands, and what the 
Navajo considered to the Hopi settlement on lands granted to 
the Navajo.lI5 
In the 1930's, the basic philosophy of federal-Indian rela-
tions changed dramatically. The Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 marked the end of allotment of tribal lands to individual 
tribal members and the beginning of encouragement of tribal re-
organization and self-reliance. Ie During this time, Congress 
passed the Act of June 14, 19341'1 to consolidate title to the vari-
ous reservation lands in that section of Arizona described in the 
Act and to define the final limits of reservation expansion in 
that area. 
The Hopi Reservation of 1882 was explicitly excluded from 
the 1934 Act to ease Hopi fears of becoming completely domi-
nated by the Navajo Tribe.18 In addition, the Hopi were assured 
that the 1934 Act was phi-ased to protect their interests in tribal 
dian Office until 1923. L. KELLy, TIm NAVA.JO INDIANS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 1900-
1935 (1970). 
13. See Exec. Orders of Oct. 29, 1878, Jan. 6, 1880, May 17, 1884, Jan. 8, 1900, 
reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 12, at 876-77. 
14. See note 12 supra. See, e.g., Exec. Order of Jan. 6, 1880, reprinted in, KAPPLER, 
supra note 12, at 876 ("as an addition to the present Navajo Reservation •••• "); Exec. 
Order of May 17, 1884, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 12, at 876 ("set apart as a 
reservation for Indian purposes •••• "). 
15. See Los Angeles Times, Sept. 16, 1979, at 1, coL 1. 
16. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1970). The major pro-
visions of this Act restricted future allotment of Indian reservation land to any Indian, 
provided funds to purchase land for landless Indians, empowered tribes to adopt demo-
cratic constitutions and by-laws, granted specific rights to tribes to incorporate and de-
fined "Indian." For a discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the Nav-
ajo, see KELLy, supra note 12, at 163. 
17. Act of June 14, 1943, Pub. L. No. 352, 48 Stat. 960 (1934). 
18. [d. ("nothing herein contained shall affect the existing status of the Moqui 
[Hopi] Indian Reservation created by Executive Order of December 16, 1882."). See also 
Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. Supp. at 1193-96. 
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holdings which were outside of the 1882 reservation lands, but· 
within the land affected by the 1934 Act.IS . 
The authors of the 1934 Act anticipated that the two tribes 
would eventually either work out their own boundaries or be-
come integrated/olD By 1934 the tribal land holdings were widely 
intermixed and created a quilt-work pattern of Navajo and Hopi 
enclaves surrounded by land held by members of the other 
tribe.21 As the Navajo Tribe, with its significantly larger popula-
tion, expanded, it exerted increasing pressure on the Hopi land 
holdings.22 The tribes failed to negotiate any disposition of the 
lands and conflict over settlements and the use of grazing lands 
continued. In response to the tribes' failure, Congress authorized 
federal court jurisdiction for a quiet title action between the two 
tribes as to the 1882 reservation lands.2s 
In Healing v. Jones,24 an action initiated by the Hopi Tribe, 
the federal district court interpreted the phrase in the Executive 
Order of 1882 "for the use and occupancy of the Moqui and such 
other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to set- . 
tIe thereon,"25 as a grant to both the Hopi and Navajo Tribes.IB 
The court found that the Navajo had been administratively set-
tled on the 1882 reservation by federal acknowledgement and by 
tolerance of the Navajo settlements on the Hopi Reservation.2'7 
The district court, therefore, granted each tribe an undivided 
one-half interest in the 1882 reservation, with the exception of a 
small section found to be in the exclusive possession of the Hopi 
Tribe.2B Healing, however, did not settle the dispute. The Hopi 
complained that the Navajo did not honor the court's decisions. 
Through a series of subsequent actions the Hopi attempted to 
19. 448 F. Supp. at 1193-96. 
20. Id. at 1195. 
21. Id. at 1185. 
22. From 1864 to 1970 the Navajo population increased from approximately 10,000 
to over 120,000. G. BOYCE, WHEN NAVAJOS HAD Too MANY SHEEP at x (1974). Opening 
Brief for Appellant at 70 n.26, Sekaquaptewa v_ MacDonald, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
23. Act of July 22, 1958, Pub. L. No. 95-531, 72 Stat. 403 (1958). 
24. 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963). 
25. Exec. Order of Dec. 16, 1882, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 12, at 805. 
26. 210 F. Supp. at 143-92. 
27. Id. at 169. 
28. Id. at 191-92. 
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force implementation of the court's decision.29 
Similarly, both tribes continued to claim the area which sur-
rounded the 1882 reservation and was described in the 1934 con-
solidation act.30 In response, Congress enacted the Jurisdictional 
Act of 1974,31 which authorized the tribes to bring a quiet title 
action in federal court. 
On the basis of the Jurisdictional Act of 1974, the Hopi 
Tribe brought a quiet title action against the Navajo Tribe. In 
Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald,32 the federal district court deter-
mined what lands were included in the 1934 Act and the nature 
and extent of the respective Hopi and Navajo land rights. The 
court first determined that the purpose of the Act was to include 
all of the executive order reservation additions within the Act's 
boundaries.33 The court found these reservation lands to be tem-
porary withdrawals of public lands because they did not confer a 
compensable title and were revocable at will. U 
In the most critical element of the decision-the determina-
tion of the respective tribal land holdings-the court focused on 
the legislative intent behind the Act. The court noted that the 
legislative history was sparse and that only one congressional 
hearing had been held, at which the minutes of several meetings 
between Bureau of Indian Affairs administrators and Hopi vil-
lage leaders had been added to the record.35 At those meetings 
the administrators assured the Hopi leaders that the wording in 
the proposed act, "as may already be located thereon", had been 
included to protect Hopi rights in the lands they occupied in 
that area and that their rights to these lands would be undis-
turbed.36 At the time of these meetings, the proposed bill also 
included a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to 
set apart, from time to time, lands within the Navajo Reserva-
29. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th eir. 1978); Sekaquaptewa v. 
MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396 (9th eir. 1976); Hamilton v. McDonald, 503 F.2d 1138 (9th eir. 
1974); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th eir. 1972). 
30. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 619 F.2d at 801. 
31. Act of Dec. 22, 1974; Pub. L. No. 95-531, 88 Stat. 1715 (1974). 
32. 448 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Ariz. 1978). 
33. Id. at 1189-91 n.7. 
34. Id. at 1189. 
35. Id. at 1193-95. 
36. Id. at 1194. 
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tion boundaries for the use of the H~pi. The district court noted, 
however, that this provision had been excluded in the resulting 
Act.37 The court considered this deletion an indication of the 
congressional intent to limit Hopi land interests.3s 
From this interpretation, the district court found that the 
Hopi Tribe held only an undivided one-half interest in land that 
tribal members had used, occupied, or possessed prior to the en-
actment of the 1934 Act.39 Both tribes appealed the district 
court's decision, and the Ninth Circuit accepted the appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b).·o 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered the respective Hopi 
and Navajo property interests in the reservation land affected by 
the 1934 Act, and whether the district court had jurisdiction to 
consider the Hopi request for an accounting of Navajo activities 
on land in which the Hopi Tribe had an interest."l 
The Hopi Tribe argued that the district court's limitation of 
Hopi land interests was contrary to the plain meaning and legis-
lative history of the 1934 Act."2 They also contended that the 
district court erred in deciding contrary to Healing v. Jones,·a 
asserting that that case was precedent for this dispute, and that 
the decision conflicted with real property law principles."· 
The Navajo Trilbe contended that not all executive order 
reservations were meant to be included in the 1934 Act. They 
argued that the 1900 Executive Order's withdrawal of public 
land was intended to be a permanent part of the Navajo Reser-
vation, and that the district court erred in holding that it repre-
sented only a tempolrary withdrawal of public land."15 
37. ld. at 1195-96. 
38. ld. at 1196. 
39.ld. 
40. 619 F.2d at 803. 
41. ld. at 804. 
42. ld. at 806; see also Opening Brief for Appellant at 15-19, Sekaquaptewa v. Mac-
Donald, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1980). 
43. 619 F.2d at 806-07 and Appellant's Opening Brief at 19-27. 
44. ld. at 806 and Appellant's Opening Brief at 21-43. 
45. ld. at 804-05 and Appellee's Opening Brief at 21-43. 
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In resolving the Navajo contentions concerning the execu-
tive order reservations, the Ninth Citcuit upheld the district 
court's finding that the overriding purpose of the Act was to 
consolidate ownership of the reservation lands.48 The Ninth Cir-
cuit also noted that the executive orders cited by the Navajo did 
not specifically mention granting title to the Navajo Tribe!' The 
court, therefore, held that all the executive order reservations 
were meant to be included in the 1934 Act, except for the 1882 
reservation which was expressly excluded.48 
The court next determined the tribes' respective property 
interests by interpreting the legislative intent of the 1934 Act.49 
The appellate court rejected the Hopi argument that the district 
court's decision conflicted with real property conveyancing prin-
ciples, and found that those principles have no application to 
federal-Indian law, particularly when they conflict with the in-
tent of Congress.llo SimiJarly, the court rejected the Hopi conten-
tion that the district court erred by being inconsistent with 
Healing v. Jones. 1I1 The court stated that even if the district 
court's holding was inconsistent, the legislative intent must 
control.1I2 
As to the legislative intent, the court found that the 1934 
Act primarily concerned Navajo affairS.1IS The Hopi were directly 
mentioned only in that section of the Act excluding the 1882 
reservation.1I4 The court then relied on the district court's inter-
pretation of the phrase "[alII ... lands ... are ... withdrawn 
... for the benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as may 
already be located thereon,"1111 and found that it was not meant 
to grant a one-half interest in the entire reservation to the 
46. ld. at 804. 
47.ld. 
48. ld. at 804·05. 
49. ld. at 806·08. 
50. ld. at 806. 
51. ld. at 806-07. In Healing v. Jones, the court noted that a 1958 statute withdrew 
the lands described in the Executive Order of 1882. The court found the Hopi Tribe to 
have an interest in all the land described in the Order, and the "other Indians" to have a 
one-half interest in the land they occupied. 
52. 619 F.2d at 807. 
53. ld. at 806. 
54.ld. 
55. ld. Act of June 14, 1934, Pub. L. No. 352, 48 Stat. 961 (1934). 
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Hopi.1I6 On the basis of this interpretation, the court affirmed 
that portion of the district court's finding that the Hopi interest 
was limited to the areas they used, occupied or possessed prior 
to the enactment of the 1934 Act.II'1 The appellate court, how-
ever, disagreed with the district court's finding that the Hopi 
were entitled to only an undivided one-half interest in the areas 
they used, occupied or possessed, and held that the Hopi have 
an exclusive interest in those areas. liB To support this interpreta-
tion, the court again relied on the legislative intent behind the 
1934 Act. Recognizing that Congress was not committed to ex-
clusive tribal areas in 1934, the court reasoned that the intent to 
limit Hopi interests to areas settled was "clear enough."IIS 
This interpretation resulted in the finding that the Hopi 
have an exclusive interests in those areas within the boundaries 
of the 1934 Act that they had settled prior to its enactment, 
with the residue being the exclusive interest of the Navajo 
Tribe.60 
The court then turned to the Hopi request to the district 
court for an accounting of Navajo activities on land found to be 
within Hopi interests.61 The Hopi contended that jurisdiction 
for an accounting WBlS provided expressly and impliedly by the 
1974 Act authorizing jurisdiction for the quiet title action and 
that an accounting is an integral part of the partition authorized 
by the Act.62 The court noted that jurisdiction to bring suit 
against an Indian tribe requires the express consent of Congress, 
and strictly interpreted the jurisdictional act.63 The court found 
no express allowance for an accounting in the 1934 Act, although 
there was such an alllowance made for the 1882 lands previously 
partitioned.M The court held that an accounting was not author-
ized and added that an accounting would not clearly aid in the 
quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the reservation lands.611 
56. 619 F.2d at 806. 
57. ld. at 807. 
5S. ld. at 80S. 
59.ld. 
60.ld. 
61. ld. at 8OS-09. 
62. ld. at 80S. and Appellant's Opening Brief at 63-73. 
63. 619 F.2d at 8OS-09. 
64. ld. at 809. 
65.ld. 
8
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D. CRITIQUE 
In reaching its holding in Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, the 
Ninth Circuit relied solely upon the legislative intent behind the 
Act of 1934. Had the dispute arisen between an Indian tribe and 
the federal government, rather than between two tribes, the 
court would have applied additional principles of federal-Indian 
law which would have dictated a significantly different out-
come.66 Similarly, had the court applied federal-Indian law prin-
ciples to the 1934 Act itself, rather than assuming the validity of 
the Act, the result might have differed.6'1 The Ninth Circuit's de-
cision effectively imposes the status quo Congress sought in 1934 
on the reality of fifty years later.6s . 
The court's opinion demonstrates the failure of this Ninth 
Circuit panel to apply federal-Indian law principles that have 
evolved from federal versus tribe and state versus tribe issues to 
the Navajo versus Hopi controversy,69 although their application 
to an intertribal conflict appears appropriate, particularly when 
the basis of the dispute is considered. The title conflict between 
the two tribes is, like many legal disputes involving Indian 
tribes, directly related to earlier acts by the federal govem-
66. The evolution of federal Indian law has resulted in the formulation of basic rules 
for resolution of Indian disputes. Central to these rules is the theory of reserved rights, 
which holds that powers of Indian tribes are not granted by Congress, but derive from 
tribal sovereignty based on the original possession of the land. United States v. Winans, 
198 U.S. 371 (1905). In addition, courts require that ambiguous provisions of treaties be 
construed as the Indian signatories would have understood them. McClanahan v. State 
Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-53 
(1832). Ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted in a light most favorable to the Indi-
ans. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943). In interpreting trea-
ties and statutes the purpose and circumstances surrounding the Act are to be consid-
ered in determining the legislative intent. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 
U.S. 78, 87 (1918). Encompassing these principles is the status of the federal government 
as a trustee to the Indians. As a trustee it is incumbent upon the government to protect 
Indian interest in land as well as education and welfare. See also Carter, Race and Power 
as Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American Indians: Land Related Cases 1887-
1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 197 (1976) for a discussion of federal guardianship theory. 
67. The court did not question the validity of the 1934 Act, although the misconcep-
tions surrounding the settling of the Navajo in the Hopi territory were noted in Healing 
v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 146-57. 
68. The court acknowledged the legislative intent behind the 1934 Act to preserve 
the status quo of the existing arrangement of the two tribes. 619 F.2d at 808. By enforc-
ing the status quo of 1934 upon the Hopi, the court in effect precluded any expansion 
and tribal growth and in fact withdrew land that the tribe was currently using. 
69. See note 67 supra. 
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ment.'10 In analyzing C\ll'rent legal issues which arise from earlier 
federal-tribal transactions, it is appropriate and necessary to ap-
ply federal-Indian law principles to the consideration of the ear-
lier acts which resulted in the present controversy. To view a 
title dispute between two tribes as strictly an intertribal affair, 
and thereby encourago intertribal conflict would appear to vio-
late the guardianship lrole assumed by the federal government.'1l 
E. CONCLUSION 
The reluctance of the Ninth Circuit to more fully apply fed-
eral-Indian law principles retards the development of the body 
of federal-Indian law and results in a distprtion of the problem. 
Unfortunately, it may also serve to postpone any actual resolu-
tion of the dispute, alld increase the possibility of a confronta-
tion between the tribos outside the legal system. 
Thomas M. Anderson* 
II. DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN HEALTH CARE 
BENEFITS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Rincon Band 0/ Mission Indians v. Harris, l the Ninth 
Circuit considered a dass action challenge to the Indian Health 
Service's (IHS) distribution of funds and services. Plaintiff al-
leged that the IHS had violated its statutory and trust duties 
and its obligation of equal protection by its disproportionately 
low distribution of health service funds to Indians in California.2 
In resolving the issue, the appellate court relied upon estab-
lished federal Indian law principles and prior case law. The 
court did not reach the trust or constitutional questions, how-
70. For an historical perspective of the evolution of this dispute, see Healing v. 
Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 125-58. 
71. See Carter, supra note 68. 
• Fourth Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 618 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Tang, J., and Curtis, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. ld. at 570. 
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ever, but decided the case strictly through statutory 
interpretation.3 
The IHS is a sub-agency in the Department of Health and 
Human Services, formerly the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare." Funding for the ms is authorized by the Snyder 
Act.5 Enacted in 1921,. the Snyder Act proyides generally for 
funding programs which benefit "Indians throughout the United 
States .... "6 Further authorization for the ms was provided by 
the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (mCIA).7 The mCIA 
was passed in 1976 by Congress "in f11161Irnent of its special re-
sponsibility and legal obligation to the American Indian people 
. . . ."8 It provides funding for health care services, including 
professional personnel and facilities. Urban Indians are specifi-
cally provided for.9 The IHS is responsible for distributing Sny-
der Act and mCIA funds to establish and maintain health care 
services and programs throughout the country/o 
The Rincon Band of Mission Indians initiated this action in 
federal district court against the Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare and the ms, as a class action on behalf of Indians 
residing in California.l1 Rincon Band alleged that the ms's allo-
cation of services was inadequate to meet the needs of their 
tribe and other California Indians.12 In Rincon 'Band of Mission 
Indians v. Califano,13 the tribe sought a declaratory judgment 
that the ms services allocation violated the constitutional right 
of equal protection of Indians residing in California. 
In a motion for summary judgment, the Rincon Band ar-
3.ld. 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2001 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (Supp. ill 1979). 
5. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) states in relevant part: "The Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, shall direct, supervise, and expend 
such moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and 
assistance of the Indians throughout the United States •••• " 
6. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). The district court noted that the benefits at issue qualified 
as a constitutionally based entitlement. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Califano, 464 
F. Supp. 934, 939 n.6 (N.D. Cal 1979) (per Renfrew, D.J.). 
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976). 
8. ld. § 1602. 
9. ld. § 1601. 
10. 618 F.2d at 570; 25 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). 
11. 464 F. Supp. 934, 935 n.l. 
12. ld. at 935. 
13. 464 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal 1979) (per Renfrew, D.J.). 
11
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gued that the evidence showed that HEW (through the IHS), 
had not only failed in its responsibility to provide health care 
services to Indians in California, but had distributed funds in a 
manner that deprived the California Indians of services compa-
rable to those services provided Indians in other parts of the 
country. I" These actions were argued to be an IHS violation of 
equal protection of law as guaranteed by the fifth amendment.lll 
In its cross-motiOlo. for summary judgment, HEW asserted 
that Congress' failure to approve IHS's request for additional 
funding beyond the IHS budget appropriation, constituted rati-
fication of the established IHS allocation procedure.I6 HEW also 
argued that the allocation system used by IHS was rationally 
based and not in violation of the equal protection clause.1'7 
The district court rejected defendant's claim of congres-
sional ratification. IS RHlying on the Rules of the House of Repre-
sentatives and case law, the court held that ratification of an 
agency's policies does not occur through appropriations unless 
express language to that effect is included in the appropriating 
legislation.I9 Since IHS's argument was based on implied rather 
than express ratification, the district court found its obligation 
to rationally and equitably distribute Snyder Act funds undi-
minished by congrElssional refusal to provide additional 
funding.20 
In considering the rationality of the allocation system used 
by the IHS, the district court reviewed IHS fund allocation and 
expenditure records. The court noted that approximately ten 
percent of the IHS national services population resided on or 
near reservations in California. However, the IHS had allocated 
no more than 1.93 % of its total funds to California in any year 
since 1956. The records further indicated that only 0.35 % of the 
total IHS funding for health facilities over a seven year period 
beginning in 1979 were allocated·to California Indians.21 
14. Id. at 936. 
15.Id. 
16.Id. 
17. Id. at 937-38. 
18. Id. at 936-37. 
19.Id. 
20. Id. at 937. 
21. Id. at 936. 
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The allocation criteria used by the IHS for distribution of 
resources were determined by the district court to be "no more 
than a bureaucratic charade . . . . "22 The IHS employed the 
seemingly sophisticated Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC) to 
index the actual needs of Indians throughout the nation. In fact, 
RAC was only applied in the distribution of approximately three 
percent of the allocated funds. The insufficiency of data called 
the reliability of these distributions into question/'s Moreover, 
the use of the RAC was not initiated until 1978, and the court 
was provided with no explanation for the prior disproportionate 
allocations. U 
The district court granted Rincon Band's motion for sum-
mary judgment, finding that IHS's allocation system violated 
the California Indians' right to equal protection of the law.25 In 
a subsequent clarification, the court declared that "[i]n accor-
dance with this conclusion, defendants are obligated to adopt a 
program for providing health services to Indians in California 
which is comparable to those offered Indians elsewhere in the 
United States."n 
B. NINTH CmcUIT OPINION 
The Secretary of HEW appealed to the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, reasserting that IHS allocations were immune 
from attack because of congressional ratification through action 
on its funding request.2'l Rincon Band reasserted that IHS allo-
cation criteria was not only a denial of equal protection but also 
a violation of the statutory and trust duties of the federal gov-
ernment to the Indians.28 
The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's claim of immunity . 
based upon congressional ratification because the argument was 
unsupported by law or fact. There was no showing that Congress 
expressly intended that the failure to appropriate additional 
funds to the IHS was meant to ratify their allocation procedures, 
22. Id. at 937. 
23. Id. at 937-38. 
24. Id. at 938-39. 
25. Id. at 939. 
26. 618 F.2d 569, 570. 
27. Id. at 573-74. 
2B. Id. at 570 & 575 n.B. 
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and case law and congressional rules prohibit ratification of an 
agency's procedures by implication.29 
The appellate court reviewed the district court's findings of 
fact, using the figures most favorable to the government. In part, 
its findings were that California Indians had received a dispro-
portionately low share of ms allocations.8o By the most gener-
ous estimate, only sellen percent of the IHS's allocation of 
IHCIA funds since 1978 was appropriated to California Indians, 
although ten percent of the national service population of 
518,000 resided in California. Other findings revealed that less 
than 0.6% of professional health care personnel were assigned to 
California and, that of the fifty-one hospitals, ninety-nine health 
care centers, and several hUndred health stations nationally, 
California Indians were served by only one hospital and two 
health care centers.81 
In considering the rationality of ms's allocation criteria, 
the court viewed the agency's obligation in the light of Morton v. 
Ruiz.82 At issue in Ruiz, as in Rincon Band, was the reasonable-
ness of procedures employed by government agencies for distri-
bution of funds and services to Indians.88 The Snyder Act, the 
primary authority for Indian benefit programs, contains no pro-
visions for eligibility or distribution of allocated funds. M The 
Supreme Court in Ruiz held that the Secretary of the Interior 
was responsible for establishing reasonable and proper eligibility 
standards.85 Relying on Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit inferred that an 
agency's distribution (:riteria must be rationally aimed at an eq-
uitable distribution of its funds.86 This conclusion was consistent 
both with established federal Indian law principles and a prior 
Ninth Circuit case requiring due process in termination of a 
benefit program for llndians.87 
29. Id. at 573-74. 
30. Id. at 571. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 572 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974». 
33. 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
34. See 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), 8upra note 5. 
35. 415 U.S. at 230-31. 
36. 618 F.2d at 572. 
37. Id. at 572; Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1974). The evolution of 
federal Indian law has developed basic rules for the resolution of disputes involving Na-
tive Americans. These principles are founded on the theory that the power of Indian 
tribes is not granted by Congress, but derives from original possession of the land by the 
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The appellate panel, relying principally upon the district 
court's factual determination, also concluded that the IHS's dis-
tribution criteria was not rationally based.88 The insufficiency of 
data available to apply the agency's RAC method of establishing 
need was a major consideration in the court's conclusion.89 
Holding that the IHS breached its statutory duty under the 
Snyder Act, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's sum-
mary judgment in favor of the California Indians.40 Having de-
cided that the IHS violated its statutory duty, the court found it 
unnecessary to reach the trust or equal protection issues!l 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Rincon Band expands the 
obligations of administrative agencies responsible for allocating 
Snyder Act funds. While the IHS, as a distributor of Snyder Act 
funds, had established administrative procedures for the dis-
bursement of funds, the court nevertheless undertook to ex-
amine the substance of those procedures to determine if they 
were "rationally aimed at an equitable distribution of funds. "42 
Basing their analysis on Ruiz and federal-Indian law principles, 
the court determined that "rational" distribution procedures 
were not enough. Distribution procedures must also be equita-
ble.48 The equitable requirement stems from federal Indian law 
principles which require an overriding duty of fairness when 
dealing with Indians,44 and a liberal construction of legislation 
that benefits Indians.45 
The Snyder Act, like the IHCIA, is phrased in general 
terms, and the administrative limitations imposed upon the IHS 
Indians. United States v. Winans, 19B U.S. 371 (1905). 
3B. 61B F.2d at 573. 
39. ld. at 572. 
40. ld. at 575. 
41. ld. at 570, 575 n.B. 
42. ld. at 572. 
43.ld. 
44. 415 U.S. at 236; Board of County Comm'rs v. Sever, 31B U.S. 705 (1943); Semi-
nole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 
(9th Cir. 1974). 
45. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 31B U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Ruiz v. Morton, 
462 F.2d BIB, B21 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd Bub nom. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); 
Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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by these acts is minimal.46 Yet, the court significantly chose to 
closely examine the IHS's internal procedure with regard to In-
dian law principles, aftHr it had already determined the criteria 
used by the agency was not rational. The result was a clarifica-
tion and expansion of administrative standards for agencies 
working with Indian benefit funds. 
Also significant was the court's determination not to reach 
the constitutional issue. Although the district court held that 
the IHS violated equal protection rights of California Indians;''l 
the Ninth Circuit's decision- rested entirely on IHS's failure to 
meet statutory requirements, thus eliminating the necessity of 
discussing the equal protection issue.48 This is notable in that an 
equal protection analysis of IHS~s procedure could have raised 
questions of Snyder Act validity.49 
The court's opinio]rl assumed the validity of IHCIA and the 
Snyder Act. However, since the Supreme Court decision in Re-
gents of the Unil)ersity of California v. Bakke,f5O programs which 
benefit a specific class on the sole basis of race are subject to 
strict constitutional analysis. Legislation benefitting Indians has 
been held not to involve a racial classification, but to be based 
upon the political status of Indian tribes as semi-sovereign polit-
ical bodies.f51 However, the Snyder Act and the IHCIA were en-
acted to benefit Indian people generaily.f52 Eligibility for benefits 
is not limited to critE~ria of tribal affiliation, reservation resi-
dence, or other politicul indentification. f5S The nature of elibility 
for these programs thus appears to be based primarily on a ra-
cial classification. Since entitlements to Snyder Act benefits 
have not been restrictE~d to Indians identifiable through political 
status, the issue of impermissible racial classification remains in-
46. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1675 (1976). 
47. 464 F. Supp. at 939. 
48. 618 F.2d at 575. 
49. See Crystal & Johnson, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REv. 587 
(1979). 
50. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
51. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974). 
52. See notes 5 & 7 supra. 
53. The Snyder Act does not define the word "Indian." The IHCIA defines "Indian" 
with broad classification criteria ending with including as an Indian any person that "(3) 
is considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be an Indian for any purpose, or (4) is 
determined to be an Indian under regulation promulgated by the Secretary." 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1603 (1976). 
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herent in any Snyder Act litigation. 
By choosing not to discuss the constitutional issue, the 
Ninth Circuit may have intentionally avoided the question of ra-
cially based Indian benefit program validity in a post Bakke rul-
ing. The Ninth Circuit's decision does, however, contribute to 
the resolution of some immediate problems in inequitable fed-
eral agency administration of Indian benefit programs. 
Thomas M. Anderson* 
• Fourth Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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